Rosatom is known as Putin's favorite knight. In 2024, the Russian president stated: “We don't just build power plants. As a rule, we create an industry in the country that starts this type of activity. We train personnel, supply the necessary materials, take away spent fuel.” This comprehensive approach, while appealing to some, also underscores why Russia is often viewed as a risky partner.
Many sources have explored the geopolitical strategy behind Russia’s leading nuclear power plant builder. However, Rosatom is not merely a “Geopolitical Arm“ or “Political corporation” designed to “create and sustain geopolitical dependencies.” Even at the tender stage, its involvement can introduce hybrid threats to the host country.
Russia has employed FIMI tactics and actors to secure nuclear construction contracts in countries such as Kazakhstan, Ghana, and Argentina.
Intense competition can drive Russia to interfere in the domestic politics of its competitors. For instance, attempts to disrupt France’s Flamanville project stemmed from rivalry with EDF, even though Rosatom collaborates with EDF’s subsidiary, Framatome, on a project in the EU.
The analysis reveals that Russia targets competitors across all nuclear sectors—from uranium mining to plant construction. In cases where Rosatom is excluded from tenders, Russian actors have retaliated, as seen in the Czech Republic.
To understand why even polite engagement with Rosatom could come at a high cost, read Osavul’s full report.
An Unavoidable Partner for Kazakhstan
By late 2024, Kazakhstan had become a key arena for competing narratives over nuclear power plant construction, with Russia aggressively defending Rosatom's interests. Putin personally "centuries-long history of life in a unified state" and likely motivated by Kazakhstan's status as a global leader in uranium reserves critical for nuclear fuel production.
On October 6, Kazakhstan held a referendum on the project. That same day, Tokayev specified that an international consortium should build the plant. The shortlist included France's EDF, South Korea's KHNP, China's CNNC, and Rosatom.
Such attacks continued, with Russian actors targeting Rosatom's rivals. For instance, on October 24, the Russian state-linked Telegram channel Rybar claimed KHNP was not credible due to disputes involving U.S. and French companies. This narrative was distributed by at least 16 actors across multiple countries in English, French, German, Italian, Spanish, and Russian, garnering over 200,000 views.
Russian-linked actors quickly mobilized on Telegram, sharing 8 messages criticizing non-Russian contenders. They highlighted the Korean reliance on American technology, the Chinese dependence on French systems, and alleged flaws in French tech. The primary source of this group has been repeatedly noticed in information attacks. By October 13, Russian actors text warning that choosing Western partners could lead to "blackmail" against Kazakhstan.
Between November 6 and 19, five more incidents were identified, focusing on Tokayev's tripto Paris and talks with French state-owned companies EDF and Orano [ORANO IS HELD BY THE FRENCH STATE UP TO 90.33% AND BY JNFL AND MHI UP TO 4.83% EACH] (80 messages).These efforts, reaching 380,000 views, accused France of seeking to turnKazakhstan into a new African-style colony, “replacing Niger”.
Mon Amie France
The story of Russian hybrid tactics in Kazakhstan's nuclear competition is striking, given that Rosatom has a joint project in Europe with Framatome, a subsidiary of France’s state-owned EDF. This partnership, focused on nuclear fuel production and supply for Europe, has been criticized by Europeans and the U.S., yet it didn’t stop Russia from targeting EDF in Kazakhstan. Additionally, Russian interference related to nuclear energy was detected in France itself.
In 2024, Osavul identified at least 70 compromised [ACTORS WHO WERE PARTICIPATED IN DISINFORMATION PROPAGATION OR IN INFLUENCE OPERATIONS] and 22 inauthentic [ACTORS WHO DEMONSTRATED COMPLEX CHARACTERISTICS OF SUCH BEHAVIOUR. FOR INSTANCE, HIGH POSTING FREQUENCY OR REPOSTING OR OTHER CONNECTIONS WITH COMPROMISED ACTORS] actors spreading malicious narratives about the Flamanville nuclear power plant, which connected to the French grid in December 2024. These narratives amplified issues such as budget overruns, a 12-year delay, and shutdowns following the plant's opening. In comment sections, were found messages warning of nuclear dangers, advised buying iodine tablets, and speculated about rising electricity costs.
Spread across Telegram, Twitter, and Facebook in Russian, French, German, and other European languages, these publications garnered 660K views. Additionally, on Dec. 9–10, 12 identical messages in Russian, French, and Finnish claimed a “terrorist threat in France” endangered nuclear plants, generating 85K views.
The Struggle for Africa
Russia has also used information attacks in Africa to compete for nuclear projects, targeting France and the U.S. Africa is a key market for nuclear power due to rising energy demand, and Russia leverages past propaganda and military interventions in the region.
Andrei Dubrovsky, representative of the Russian propaganda project “African Initiative” highlighted Russia's interest in Niger's uranium mines at the very beginning of 2024, even before Niger’s president announced the termination of France’s Orano contract on June 20, 2024. Throughout 2024, at least 916 compromised and 292 inauthentic actors covered the contract’s termination, with Russian channels like Afrique Libre framing it as Russia supporting Niger’s sovereignty over its resources. Already in November 2024, Niger, with the world’s 7th largest uranium deposits, invited Russian companies to explore and exploit its resources.
In Ghana, Russia competed with the U.S.’s Regnum Technology, France’s EDF, and China’s CNNC for the contract to build the country’s first small nuclear reactor. In January 2024, 10 entities shared 11 identical reports in Russian and French, claiming U.S. startups lacked the expertise for such technology, positioning Russia as the sole proven leader. These messages gained 55K views. After Ghana signed a contract with Regnum in September, Russian actors claimed the deal wasn’t viable without external investors, casting doubt on Ghana’s ability to fund the project.
Argentina, But Only as Dependent
Latin America is also an essential market for emerging nuclear power. In LatAm Russia collaborating with Brazil, Bolivia, and Mexico, and seeking to expand its influence in Argentina, Chile, and El Salvador.
Russia’s favorable stance toward Argentina’s new president, Javier Milei, shifted after Milei’s request to explore NATO partnership and his plan to shut down nuclear facilities. On April 2, six critical Spanish-language reports were published, criticizing Milei’s nuclear decision, also echoed in Russian, gaining over 12K views.
In December 2024, Milei announced Argentina’s new nuclear program, focusing on modular reactors and becoming a hub for AI companies due to rising energy demands. This triggered Russian backlash: during December Osavul identified five nuclear-related incidents targeting Milei.
The largest incident, on December 11, stemmed from critical remarks by Adriana Serquis, former head of Argentina’s National Atomic Energy Commission. Her comments were used in an RT Spanish-language piece, reprinted by 11 websites, and shared by at least 8 Telegram channels.
On December 13, 14, and 18, additional incidents criticized Milei’s plans, raising concerns about technological dependence on the U.S., the feasibility of nuclear power in Patagonia, and the importance of continuing the previous government’s nuclear program. These posts gathered over 18K views.
On December 29, Telegram and Twitter accounts spread claims that Argentina's National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA) had been hacked, with leaked data allegedly posted on the dark web. According to the messages, the leaked files contained information about “the Argentine SMR CAREM nuclear reactor, other projects, and important information regarding the CNEA." The source of the post on Instagram commented on the news: "I hope that in a few years, no Artificial Intelligence data centers using a modular nuclear reactor will appear in developed countries." The same user on the X platform frequently shares pro-Russian content. RedPacket Security confirmed the leak but noted the absence of download links or images, suggesting it was limited to textual data.
Revenge for the Czechs Instead of Conclusion
Russia’s loss of the Czech Republic’s tender underscores how any collaboration with Rosatom leads to information attacks, even years later.
In 2021, Russia competed with U.S. Westinghouse, China General Nuclear Power, France’s EDF, and South Korea’s KHNP for the Dukovany power unit tender. However, after links to explosions at the Vrbetice ammunition depot, Czech President Milos Zeman signed a law barring Russian and Chinese companies. Despite this, Russia continued to target the tender from 2021 to 2024, highlighting competitors' flaws and sowing divisions. For example, on July 17, 2024, 11 entities spread a message claiming South Korea's KHNP won, stating, "Europeans no longer believe in the ability of the French to build nuclear plants."
